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SYMPOSIUM ON FEDERAL JUDICIAL POWER
FOREWORD

Despite its language and position within the Constitution, article III does
not clearly define the federal "judicial Power." While articles I and II are
specific grants of power to the legislative and executive branches of national
government, article III is rather murky. It serves more to structure the
federal judicial function than to create it. Article III simply vests the judicial
power in a Supreme Court and describes the types of controversies to which
the judicial power applies, but does not define that power. This textual
omission, coupled with language giving Congress the power to create lower
federal courts and regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
essentially empowers Congress to implement the federal judicial power.'
Thus, although article III provides for the federal judicial power, congressional legislation is often the true source of specific judicial powers.
Just as it contributes to other areas of substantive law, the federal courts'
interpretation of statutes defining judicial powers serves to shape the judicial
function. The judiciary's separate view of its own proper constitutional role
also has great impact. In Marbury v. Madison,2 the Supreme Court exercised
the power of judicial review-a power granted by neither explicit constitutional provision nor federal statute-to prevent Congress from enlarging the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. The current Supreme Court, in contrast,
has validated attempts by Congress to assign arguably legislative and executive functions to article III judges.' Thus, Congress and the federal courts
together continue to define the federal judicial power. This Symposium
attempts to highlight several insightful examples of that joint effort.
The law of federal appellate jurisdiction is an excellent context in which
to examine the interplay between congressional statute and judicial interpretation. In "Toward a Unified Theory of the Jurisdiction of the United States
Courts of Appeals," Professor Thomas E. Baker notes Congress' statutory
preoccupation with the middle tier of the federal courts. Through interpretation and application, the courts, in turn, have been able to shape the
federal appellate power. For example, federal statute allows appellate courts
to review "all final decisions of the district courts of the United States

1. Cf. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTIrUTIONAL LAW, § 3-5, at 33 (1978). "[O]utside the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, federal courts cannot use their power to review the
constitutionality of any government action unless Congress first authorizes the federal courts
to exercise jurisdiction." Id. (emphasis in original).
2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

3. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989) (rejecting separation of powers
challenges to judicial participation on the United States Sentencing Commission); Morrison v.
Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988) (rejecting separation of powers challenges to article III court
established to appoint independent prosecutor).
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"'I However the finality doctrine, the collateral order doctrine and "the
twilight zone" are all equally relevant judicial contributions to defining the
appellate review power. Thus, to a large extent, "[i]t is, emphatically, the
province and duty of the judicial department, to say" 5 what its powers are.
Professor Baker's article also represents the exercise of an increasingly
important judicial function. The article is an adaptation of a primer commissioned by the Federal Judicial Center, an agency within the judicial
branch whose purpose is "to further the development and adoption of
improved judicial administration in the courts of the United States." ' 6 The
primer is designed as a reference tool for appellate judges on the federal
bench. This laudatory goal is less controversial than other "administrative"
activities assigned to the federal judiciary. For example, dissension between
Chief Justice Rehnquist and other members of the Judicial Conference of
the United States recently made headlines. The committee of federal jurists
was created by statute to study court procedures and to recommend legislation.7 Although the full committee voted to delay action on a proposal to
limit appeals by death row inmates, the Chief Justice sought immediate
congressional approval of the proposal. In response, fourteen senior federal
judges issued a letter seeking assurance that Congress consider dissenting
judicial voices. 8 Thus, by assigning new powers to the judiciary, Congress
alters that branch's political role as well.
Article III may not expressly deny the judiciary such administrative powers,
but it does limit the judicial power to "Cases" and "Controversies." This
article III separation of powers doctrine serves to define the powers of the
courts in relation to the political governmental branches. Because the issue
of the courts' proper role usually arises when the judiciary is vested with
arguably legislative or executive functions, ensuring the independence of the
courts is often a self-assigned function. In his article "Separation of Powers,
Judicial Authority, and the Scope of Article III: The Troubling Cases of
Morrison and Mistretta," Professor Martin H. Redish criticizes the current
Supreme Court's willingness to rationalize breaches of the separation of
powers doctrine. Under attack is the Court's ad hoc balancing approach
used in Morrison v. Olson9 and Mistretta v. United States.10 Professor Redish
proposes a rule which limits article III courts and judges to adjudicating
cases and controversies, and to performing administrative tasks directly
related to that adjudicatory function. Adoption of this rule would not only
reverse Morrison and Mistretta, it would also invalidate a generally well-

4. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
5. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).

6. 28 U.S.C. § 620 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
8. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1989, at 1, col. 4.
9. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
10. 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).

19891

FOREWORD

accepted federal judicial power-the promulgation of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Federal Rules of Evidence under the Rules Enabling Act. As
disruptive as Professor Redish's proposal may be, the potential for locating
other nonjudicial functions within the federal courts may be even more
troublesome.
A separate student note discussing the Mistretta decision suggests the
implications of permitting Congress to require the extrajudicial service of
article III judges for essentially political purposes. The note details the
historical importance placed on a judiciary separate from the political branches
and the role of an independent judiciary within the separation of powers
framework. The pragmatic reasoning of the Mistretta majority is viewed as
a dangerous precedent for the further proliferation of "independent agencies" within the counter-majoritarian judicial branch. Moreover, the note
explains how the true independence of the federal judiciary, which is so
essential to its role, is similarly diminished.
Just as federal courts define the judicial function within the separation of
powers constraints of article III, they also define the limit on the "Judicial
power" imposed by the eleventh amendment. From Hans v. Louisiana,'
which based an expansive interpretation of the eleventh amendment in part
on the common law sovereign immunity doctrine, to Exparte Young, 2 which
created an often-criticized fiction allowing federal suit against state officials,
the Supreme Court has shaped the contours of the eleventh amendment limit
on the federal judicial power. As several Symposium authors note, this
judicial contribution has also muddled this area of the law. In several decisions
last term the Supreme Court continued to define the federal judicial power
over the states. In perhaps the most important of those decisions, the Court
held that Congress may abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity
when it legislates pursuant to the commerce clause. However, before finding
that Congress permitted states to be sued in federal court the Court will
require Congress to make a "clear statement" of its intent.'"
Criticism of the Court's clear statement rule is the subject of a colloquy
between two eleventh amendment scholars. In "Congress, the Supreme
Court, and the Eleventh Amendment: A Comment on the Decisions During
the 1988-89 Term," Professor Erwin Chemerinsky contends that the recent
decisions perpetuate an incoherent doctrine based on judicial compromise
and irrelevant historical analysis. Professor Chemerinsky points out that the
clear statement rule is at odds with the views of eight Supreme Court justices.
Moreover, the unprecedented requirement of unequivocal textual support for
congressional intent is justified by neither the sovereign immunity nor the
diversity jurisdiction theories of the eleventh amendment. Thus, Professor
Chemerinsky views the recent decisions as an attempt by some members of

11. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
12. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
13. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
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the Court to preclude state liability in federal courts. The author suggests
that the Court shift its focus from the intent of the Framers and instead
determine the appropriate role of state sovereign immunity in the modern
American system of government.
Professor William P. Marshall finds a separate basis of criticism for the
clear statement rule. In "The Eleventh Amendment, Process Federalism and
the Clear Statement Rule," Professor Marshall contends that the theory of
"process federalism" underlies the basis for the recent Supreme Court
decisions. That theory presupposes that the states do not need judicial
protection from the federal government because Congress is comprised of
representatives from the states. This premise supported the Supreme Court's
rejection of a tenth amendment challenge in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority. 4 Thus, the clear statement rule merely compels
Congress to be aware of the states' interests at stake when creating state
liability in federal court. However, Professor Marshall notes the inherent
inconsistency of permitting Congress to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity because Congress will protect states' interests while also requiring
Congress to do so explicitly in order to make it aware of what it is doing.
Like Professor Chemerinsky, Professor Marshall suggests that the clear
statement rule allows the Court to frustrate congressional intent when it
considers state liability improper.
Professor Michael Wells examines the tension between two powers of the
federal judiciary which have neither a constitutional nor a statutory basis.
In his article "The Unimportance of Precedent in the Law of Federal
Courts," Professor Wells first examines the judicial doctrine of stare decisis.
Adherence to precedent is the judicial vehicle for effectuating predictable
law and efficient decisionmaking. Stare decisis, however, impairs the judicial
function of improving the law. Because the duty to reform the law varies
according to the type of law involved, Professor Wells argues that judicial
reform is most important in the area of federal jurisdiction. The law of
federal courts defines the proper role of the judiciary within a system of
separation of powers and federalism. Thus, precedent is properly a weak
restraint in federal court cases. Supreme Court judicial activism in this area
is not surprising, Professor Wells contends, because the Court is a political
body with a certain interest and expertise in federal court law. Perhaps the
individual jurist ultimately places an imprimatur on federal judicial power.
The interplay of congressional statutes and judicial doctrine is also highlighted in Paul J. Kozacky's article, "Narrow Venue Statutes and Third
Party Practice: Some Third Party Defendants Get To Go Home." The
author examines case law which applies the narrow venue provisions of
substantive statutes to ancillary third party claims. For reasons of judicial
economy, the federal courts generally have not required a third party plaintiff
to independently satisfy venue requirements when suing a third patty defen-

14. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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dant.11 However, several courts have held that third party practice must yield
to the restrictive venue provisions which apply to particular types of cases.
The author contends that such decisions unnecessarily increase litigation
costs and the size of federal dockets and thus are inconsistent with the
policies underlying third party practice.
This Symposium is not intended to be a comprehensive overview of a
narrow topic. The sources of federal judicial power are too many and too
diffuse for an exhaustive examination. One aim of this Symposium is to
demonstrate the myriad judicial duties and powers which lie outside article
III. The articles collected here also offer an anecdotal view of the issues of
federal judicial power. What nonadjudicative powers may Congress assign
to the judiciary? Under what circumstances may a state be sued in federal
court? When does a federal appellate court have jurisdiction? Should a
federal court defer to precedent or should it seek to improve the law?
Because defining the powers of the federal courts is so important, Professor
Wells contends that precedent is appropriately a weak constraint for courts
deciding such issues. Congress will undoubtedly assign new rules for the
courts in the future, and the judiciary will determine the contours of those
new roles. Thus, a clear definition of the federal "judicial Power" is not
immediately available. Neither may it be desired. Congress and the courts
themselves have combined to define the proper federal judicial powers. This
successful joint effort may have been the intent of murky article III.
Michael O'Neil*

15.

6 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,

§ 1455 (1971);

15 WRIGHT,

§ 3808 (1986).
* The author was the Symposium Editor of the Volume 38 DePaul Law Review editorial
board and solicited the articles for the Symposium on Federal Judicial Power. Mr. O'Neil is
now an associate with the Chicago law firm of Keck, Mahin & Cate.
MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,

